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Constitutional Law-TINKERING WITH TINKER: ACADEMIC FREEDOM
IN THE PUBLIC ScHooLs-Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,
108 S. Ct. 562 (1988)
"Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom ....
"It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate. "2
"[We hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. "3
THIS inquiry will examine the constitutional limits on the authority
of local school officials to prescribe what students study and
teachers teach, or, stated from a different perspective, the extent to
which students and teachers can shape curriculum regardless of the
wishes of school officials. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhl-
meier,4 the United States Supreme Court has written a new chapter in
a book whose outline has never been altogether clear. This study first
will place that decision in context by a brief review of the previous
case law.' Then it will analyze the Kuhlmeier case and discuss its im-
plications for this area of constitutional jurisprudence.
I. BEFORE KUHLMEIER
Courts grappling with constitutional rights in the school setting often
have quoted Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
1. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
2. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
3. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 (1988) (footnote omitted).
4. Id.
5. There are several works which provide a much more detailed coverage of this area of
law prior to Kulhmeier. See, e.g., Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between
Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647 (1986); Freeman, The
Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students in the Public School Classroom: A
Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1984); Diamond, The First Amend-
ment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 79 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1981);
Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What
They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1976).
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District6 for the proposition that neither students nor teachers "shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." 7 Whether holding in favor of plaintiff teachers and
students or defendant school officials, courts regularly have paid hom-
age to what has become the underlying principle of Tinker: the author-
ity of school officials over students and teachers is limited by the
Constitution.
At the same time, however, Tinker voiced customary deference to
school officials. Justice Fortas stated for the majority that "the Court
has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in
the schools." 8 Tinker thus enunciates two dissonant poles which courts
working in this area must confront: deference to the broad authority of
school officials versus the constitutional guarantees of teachers and stu-
dents.
The facts of Tinker did not implicate the school curriculum directly.
Fifteen-year-old John Tinker and two other students decided to wear
black armbands to school in protest against the Vietnam War. School
officials learned of the plan and adopted a policy prohibiting the wear-
ing of these armbands. When the students refused to remove their arm-
bands at school, they were suspended. 9
In holding that the policy violated the students' first amendment
rights, the Court was careful to emphasize that it would not protect
expression which was disruptive or 'intrusive upon the rights of others.
Justice Fortas observed that
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior- materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.'0
Despite the concerns of Justice Black that the Court was improperly
limiting the decision-making power of school officials," this "Tinker
6. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
7. Id. at 506.
8. Id. at 507.
9. Id. at 504. The Tinker court, however, did not intimate that its reasoning was limited to
the non-curricular context.
10. Id. at 513.
11. Id. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting) ("the Court arrogates to itself, rather than to the
State's elected officials charged with running the schools, the decision as to which school disci-
plinary regulations are 'reasonable' ").
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test" has not been applied to strip school boards of their basic author-
ity. 12
In 1982, Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School Dis-
trict No. 26 v. Pico3 presented the Court with a challenge to a local
school board's removal from the school library of certain books, char-
acterized by the board as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-
Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy." 1 4 The posture of the case was such that
it could have been decided either on procedural or constitutional
grounds.15 The result was a plurality opinion with rich dicta relating to
the constitutional issues, several concurrences, and several dissents. 16
In fashioning the opinion of the plurality, Justice Brennan character-
ized the case as follows:
In sum, the issue before us in this case is a narrow one, both
substantively and procedurally. It may best be restated as two distinct
questions. First, does the First Amendment impose any limitations
upon the discretion of petitioners to remove library books from the
[school]? Second, if so, do the affidavits and other evidentiary
materials before the District Court, construed most favorably to
respondents, raise a genuine issue of fact whether petitioners might
have exceeded those limitations?"
12. For example, in one typical case, Solmitz v. Maine School Admin. Dist. No. 59, 495
A.2d 812 (Me. 1985), the Supreme Court of Maine cited a concern for safety as sufficient
grounds under Tinker for a public high school to cancel a "Symposium on Tolerance Day,"
after news that a lesbian was to participate led to threats of damage and disruption to the school.
13. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
14. Id. at 857 (quoting Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474
F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)).
The books were K. VoNEGUTr, JR., SLAUGHnxrHOUSE-FrvE (1969); D. MORRIS, THE NAKED APE
(1967); P. THOMAS, DOWN THEsE MEAN STREETS (1967); BEST SHORT STOIuES By NEGRO WRI-
TERS (L. Hughes ed. 1967); ANONYMOUs, Go ASK ALICE (1971); 0. LA FARGE, LAUGHING Boy
(1929); R. WRIGHT, BLACK Boy (1945); A. CHILDRESS, HERO AIN'T NortIN' BuT A SANDWICH
(1973); E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1968); A READER FOR WRITERS (J. Archer ed. 1971); and B.
MALAmuD, THE FIXER (1966). Pico, 457 U.S. at 856-57 n.3.
15. The action was initiated by students seeking injunctive relief. The district court granted
a summary judgment in favor of the board, but a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit re-
versed and remanded for trial. 457 U.S. at 858-60.
16. Justice Brennan announced the decision of the Court, which was joined by Justices
Marshall, Stevens, and in all except Part II(A)(1), which contained an important segment of the
first amendment analysis, by Justice Blackmun, who also filed a separate concurrence. Justice
White concurred in the judgment and filed an opinion stressing the procedural question. The
dissent of Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice
Powell also filed a separate dissent. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissent which the Chief Justice and
Justice Powell joined. Finally, Justice O'Connor filed a two-paragraph statement explaining her
reasons for joining the Burger dissent.
17. Pico, 457 U.S. at 863.
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In finding that the board's action, if determined to be as alleged, had
violated the students' constitutional rights, the plurality limited its hold-
ing severely:
[W]e hold that local school boards may not remove books from school
library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those
books and seek by their removal to "prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion." Such
purposes stand inescapably condemned by our precedents. '8
This narrow statement of the holding,' 9 however, came amid pas-
sages of dicta which approach a more general analysis of the resolution
of conflicts between school board authority and students' rights. Justice
Brennan stressed the deference owed the actions of elected school
boards.2 Furthermore, he was careful to separate the library from the
curriculum at large. "Petitioners might well defend their claim of abso-
lute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to
inculcate community values." ' 21 Despite these pronounced bows in the
direction of local board, the plurality was faced with facts involving
books in a library, which seem much closer to the teaching mission than
Tinker's armband, and found that here the board's authority was lim-
ited if exercised in pursuit of an impermissible motive. Finally, the plu-
rality delineated a positive "right to receive information" to be reposed
in students in the school environment.2
The dissenters objected to the analysis of the plurality and to the
"right to receive.'"' They also voiced federalism-based concerns that
the Court had delved too far into the local management of schools. 24
18. Id. at 872 (citation omitted) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).
19. See id. at 861 ("We emphasize at the outset the limited nature of the substantive ques-
tion presented by the case before us.").
20. See id. at 863 ("The Court has long recognized that local school boards have broad
discretion in the management of school affairs."); id. at 869 ("In rejecting petitioners' claim of
absolute discretion to remove books from their school libraries, we do not deny that local school
boards have a substantial legitimate role to play in the determination of school library con-
tent."); id. at 866 ("[C]ourts should not 'intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in
the daily operation of school systems' unless 'basic constitutional values' are 'directly and
sharply implicate[dJ' in those conflicts") (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968)).
21. Id. at 869.
22. Id. at 866-68.
23. Id. at 887 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 895 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 911-12
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 893 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 921
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Pico left many understandably perplexed. 25 Did the plurality define
the outer limits of the right to academic freedom? Might the Court's
entrance into the realm of educational materials herald other intrusions
into areas touching upon the curriculum itself? What are the implica-
tions of a "right to receive"? The Court in Pico flirted with a constitu-
tional analysis of rights related to the school's formal educative
function more closely than in any other decision not controlled by the
establishment clause, 6 and in so doing raised as many questions as an-
swers.
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraserrl came before the Court in
1986. The case involved the disciplining of a high school student follow-
ing his delivery of a speech in support of a candidate for school office.
Though advised by teachers not to make the speech because of its heavy
reliance on sexual innuendo and double entendre, the student delivered
it at an assembly, described as "part of a school-sponsored educational
program in self-government. "28 Students could choose either to attend
the program or go to study hall.29
The Ninth Circuit had affirmed the district court's declaratory judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the school district had vio-
lated his first amendment rights when it suspended him and removed
his name from the list of candidates for commencement speakers.30 The
board maintained that the speech had disrupted the assembly, that the
board had an interest in maintaining civility in the schools, and that the
board had authority to determine the speech inappropriate since it had
been delivered as part of an educational program. 31 Both the two-judge
25. See Note, Reshelving the First Amendment: Board of Education, Island Trees Union
Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1057 (1984); Comment, Board of
Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 561
(1984); Comment, Education or Indoctrination-Removal of Books from Public School Librar-
ies: Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 68 MINN. L.
REv. 213 (1983).
Compare Bowman v. Bethel-Tate Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio 1985), vacated,
798 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1986) (without opinion), which used Pico to grant injunctive relief to
plaintiffs after a school board decision to forbid the production of an elementary school play,
Sorcerer and Friends, with Bell v. U-32 Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 939 (D. Vt. 1986), which
refused to allow similar relief after the school board determined not to allow the performance of
Runaways. While Bowman found the play to be a voluntary activity not a part of the required
curriculum, 610 F. Supp. at 581, Bell determined the reverse. 630 F. Supp. at 944.
26. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987) (striking down a Louisiana stat-
ute requiring that instruction on the origin of the human species must include both "evolution-
science" and "creation-science").
27. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
28. Id. at 3162.
29. Id.
30. Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1985) rev'd, 106
S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
31. Id. at 1358-59.
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majority opinion and the dissent relied on Pico and other case law con-
cerning the first amendment in the schools. The split in the panel came
over differing views as to the amount of disruption necessary to limit
speech under the Tinker standard.32
The circuit majority in Bethel reasoned that the option to attend
study hall rather than attend the assembly indicated that the assembly
was not a required activity. Pico was read to operate against the board
in such a situation, "beyond the compulsory environment of the class-
room." 33 The court of appeals then determined not to give public
school officials power to regulate the speech of high school students
which school officials consider to be indecent under any possible FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation4 obscenity analysis. 5
The Ninth Circuit majority also cited Pico for the proposition that
school board discretion is limited by the first amendment.3 6 The dissent,
on the other hand, cited Pico to support "a presumption against judi-
cial involvement in the schools ' 3 7 and stressed that the board's duty to
inculcate community values should be limited only from the pursuit of
impermissible purposes.3 This difference in approach well illustrates
the malleable quality of Pico. That the circuit court majority was aware
that Pico might cut the other way is clear from its reliance on a circuit
precedent,39 rather than Pico to indicate its awareness of the deference
due local boards.40 The circuit court majority was using Pico in its
board-limiting mode. To cite it also as board-supportive would make
the majority seem to go in both ways at once.
The Supreme Court reversed. The majority, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Burger, said that the circuit panel had read the protections es-
tablished in Tinker too broadly,4' and it distinguished Fraser's situation
from that of Tinker:
32. Id. at 1360 ("we fail to see how we can distinguish this case from Tinker on the issue of
disruption").
33. Id. at 1364 (citing Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982)).
34. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In this case the Court allowed the FCC to regulate materials for
broadcast which did not meet the level of being obscene, but which instead met a lesser standard
of being indecent.
35. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1363. The court indicated that it was not reaching the question of
whether the board might control instructional materials that it considered offensive, and noted
that Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Pico had raised a similar point. Id. at n. 10 (citing Pico,
457 U.S. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
36. Id. at 1358 ("The discretion of school authorities in managing school affairs is neces-
sarily limited . . . by 'the imperatives of the First Amendment.' ") (quoting Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
864 (1982)).
37. Id. at 1366.
38. Id. at 1367-68.
39. Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982).
40. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1358, 1363-64.
41. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3163 (1986).
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Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands in
Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any
political viewpoint. The First Amendment does not prevent school
officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech
such as respondent's would undermine the school's basic educational
mission .42
The Court stressed that the schools have an inculcative function43 and
that "the constitutional rights of students in public school are not auto-
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.""
Moreover, the opinion included the following statement on extracurric-
ular educational activities which may be quite influential as the effects
of Fraser continue to be felt in the courts below:
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools
is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools
must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order.
Consciously or otherwise, teachers-and indeed the older students-
demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political
expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class.
Inescapably, like parents, they are role models. The schools, as
instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of
civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates
lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged
in by this confused boy.45
Such language indeed suggests that courts may limit Tinker a great deal
in support of the school's perception of proper conduct.
In addition, the majority offered the following characterization of
Pico: "And in addressing the question whether the First Amendment
places any limit on the authority of public schools to remove books
from a public school library, all Members of the Court, otherwise
sharply divided, acknowledged that the school board has the authority
to remove books that are vulgar." The least one may say about this
statement is that it defines one of the permissible purposes that a school
board may have in performing its duties. A much more limiting effect,
however, may be seen. Chief Justice Burger focused on the school li-
brary context and book removal aspects of Pico and found, even there,
a non-limiting feature of the holding. One might conclude that the
42. Id. at 3166.
43. Id. at 3164 (relying on Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 3165.
46. Id.
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Court is not reluctant to extend Pico, and that it has aligned itself with
those who cite the case as supportive of deference to school boards.
Justice Brennan, concurring, was careful to protect Tinker and Pico:
"[The Court's holding concerns only the authority that school officials
have to restrict a high school student's use of disruptive language in a
speech given to a high school assembly." 47 In essence, Justice Brennan
tried to limit the holding to its facts, being willing to find the speech
disruptive and to acknowledge the board's authority to teach civil con-
duct,4 yet opposing modification of any previous decisions. This may
have reflected a concern that the Court was inclined to limit Tinker
further. Such a limitation has now been expressly accomplished in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.49
Tinker made clear that pure political speech which does not interfere
with the rights of others must receive full constitutional protection. At
the same time, the Court in Tinker acknowledged that the states have
great discretion in controlling public schools. Accordingly, when courts
have been called upon to decide constitutional questions arising from
the discharge of a teacher or disciplining of a student, they have been
forced to steer between the Scylla of young Tinker's right to free ex-
pression and the Charybdis of the school officials' right to maintain
control over the schools.
In 1982, the Pico Court tried to clarify the borders of constitutional
protection in the school setting. The result was a difficult plurality deci-
sion in which the Court seemed to provide a kind of negative protection
against decisions to take materials away from students after the school
had made them available. The nature of the Pico plurality, concurring,
and dissenting opinions, however, makes the meaning of the case un-
clear. On one hand, Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, estab-
lished that the motives of school officials affect the constitutional
analysis of their actions. A desire to promote doctrinaire views is sus-
pect, and when officials seek to control the flow of ideas based on such
motives, they offend the first amendment. On the other hand, Justice
Brennan suggested that where the curriculum itself is involved, school
officials have plenary control. The Court, however, also referred to a
student's "right to receive," a concept surely akin to academic free-
dom.
In general, Pico seemed to extend the protections of Tinker. If the
first amendment extended to the school library, were there other areas
within the school that fell under its commands? Again, details are
47. 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3168 (Brennan, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 3167-68.
49. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
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wanting. The school cannot take books off the shelves for doctrinaire
purposes, but it has control over which books to buy, perhaps without
regard to its motives. There may be a right of access for students, but
does it extend to teachers?
II. TINKERING WITH TINKER: HAZEL WOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT
v. KUHLMEIER
Speech clause cases generally have interpreted existing Supreme
Court teachings to uphold official control of the core of the school pro-
gram. With activities on the margin, such as plays50 and school newspa-
pers, 1 there have been variations because facts and views of governing
precedents differ.
A fundamental tension remains: the curriculum cannot be at the
mercy of competing demands of students and teachers, but students
and teachers cannot function productively if the minority can be sub-
jected to curricula designed by repressive motives of school board ma-
jorities. In view of this state of the law, schools will look carefully at
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier to determine what they may
teach about these issues.
A. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District: The Cases Below
This case has a full record of published opinions.12 Two of the dis-
trict court's published memoranda are of interest in that they provide
full accounts of the reasoning of a court struggling with these school-
related constitutional issues (a third is devoted to mootness). Examina-
tion of the decision of the Eighth Circuit also is instructive.
1. The Facts
In his memorandum decision, Chief District Judge Nangle, sitting
without a jury, presented lengthy findings of fact." Giving legal effect
to these facts became an important, even dispositive feature of the sub-
sequent appellate decisions. In short summary, the case arose from a
decision by a high school principal to delete from the school newspaper
50. See supra note 25.
51. The variance in reasoning of the district, circuit, and Supreme Court in Kuhlmeier well
illustrates this point.
52. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 578 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (pre-trial
motions), modified, 596 F. Supp. 1422 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (mootness issues resolved), modified,
607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (final order), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108
S. Ct. 562 (1988).
53. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1451-61.
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two articles, Pressure Describes It All For Today's Teenagers and Preg-
nancy Affects Many Teens Each Year.14
The district court determined that the high school newspaper, Spec-
trum, was closely connected to the school's Journalism II class, 5
though the paper accepted submissions from non-journalism students,
and Journalism II students were not required to publish their work for
a grade. The faculty advisor did, however, have pre-publication review
of the paper.16
There were several policies which might have applied to the paper,
including a publication policy, a school board policy on student expres-
sion, and a policy on the presentation of controversial issues in the
classroom. 7 In fact, the publication policy of the paper made express
reference to the rights "clarified in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.' '58
The principal maintained that he decided to delete the articles be-
cause they were personal, highly sensitive, and inappropriate for use in
a school newspaper . 9 There was additional concern that the article on
pregnancy, which was based on interviews with girls in the school,
might reveal the identity of individual students, and also that the story
on divorce was written so as to be unfair to a parent of one of the
students interviewed. 6
The district court gave more weight to the testimony of defendants'
expert on the proper use of journalistic technique in the preparation of
the articles. It also found that the judgment of the professional educa-
tors involved in the decision "that portions of the articles in question
were not appropriate for high school age readers or publication in a
school sponsored newspaper" is "reasonable and entitled to great def-
erence. "61
2. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs filed a complaint asking for actual and punitive damages,
declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. 62 The
first of the district court's published memoranda dealt with several pre-
trial motions. One of these, defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
54. Id. at 1457, 1459.
55. Id. at 1452.
56. Id. at 1453.
57. Id. at 1454-57.
58. Id. at 1455.
59. Id. at 1459.
60. Id. at 1460-61.
61. Id. at 1461.
62. Kuhlmeier, 578 F. Supp. at 1290.
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subject matter jurisdiction, raised an interesting issue with respect to
the courts and the school curriculum.
Defendants' motion was founded on the theory that the newspaper
was part of the curriculum, that decisions as to curricula were solely
within the discretion of school officials and, hence, that no constitu-
tional question was involved. 63 This line of argument put squarely to
the court the extreme view of school board control over the curriculum.
Judge Nangle addressed this contention directly:
[D]efendants' argument proceeds from the mistaken premise that if
Spectrum is a part of the Hazelwood East curriculum, as opposed to a
public forum for student expression, first amendment values are not
implicated. This Court agrees that school officials have a great deal of
discretion in the realm of determining curriculum. However, that
discretion is not without limits. Defendants are incorrect in stating
that constitutional values are not implicated in curricular decisions.
"It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." Therefore, the mere fact that Spectrum may be a
part of, or related to, Hazelwood East's curriculum does not deprive
this Court of subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the
conduct complained of comports with the requirements of the first
amendment .64
Judge Nangle's perspective clearly displays the belief that even with re-
spect to the curriculum there is some Tinker protection. On the other
hand, counsel for the defense found enough material in the case law to
suggest the argument of absolute control without constitutional limit.
3. The District Court Decision
In its findings of fact, the court concluded that the paper was part of
the school's Journalism II class and was not a public forum.65 Thus, the
analysis was curricular in nature. In organizing the problem, Judge
Nangle succinctly stated the crux of these types of problems:
Two lines of cases have developed for dealing with student free
speech and press issues. One line of cases consists of those situations
where student speech or conduct occurred outside of official school
programs. In the other are cases where the speech or conduct in
question occurred within the context of school-sponsored programs. 66
63. Id. at 1291.
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. 607 F. Supp. at 1461.
66. Id. at 1462.
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The court correctly noted that "[s]tudents' first amendment rights
generally prevail where the speech or conduct that is sought to be pro-
hibited or regulated is private, non-school-sponsored and non-program
related.' '67 In other words, these cases are more or less on point with
Tinker. "On the other hand, the results have been mixed in cases where
educators have attempted to regulate, prohibit or punish student speech
or conduct in the context of school-sponsored publications, activities or
curricular matters. '6
In the first line of cases, controlled by Tinker, disruption vel non of
school activities is the operative question as to whether student rights
must give way to school demands. In the second, "something less than
substantial disruption" may justify prior restraint of student speech. 69
Still, officials must demonstrate a reasonable basis for their action. 70
Because the court held that "[tihe full panoply of precise substantive
and procedural regulations is not required within the ... curriculum,"
the exercise of discretion by the Hazelwood school officials did not of-
fend the students' first amendment rights.7 Judge Nangle's analysis
tried to steer a course between the competing Tinker objectives, decid-
ing, however, that Tinker did not require the same protection for
school-sponsored and non-school-sponsored activities.
4. The Eighth Circuit's Reversal
A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court. Crucial to the appellate court's decision was its view that
on the facts before it the newspaper Spectrum was a public forum for
the expression of student opinion. 72 The circuit court also noted the pri-
mary importance of Tinker, although the district court had decided that
full Tinker protection was not available within the curriculum. 73 Be-
cause the court could find no basis for believing that the articles in
question would cause disruption to the school, it turned to the second
prong of the Tinker test, involving inquiry as to whether the rights of
others were invaded by the articles .74 The majority held that "[any
yardstick less exacting than potential tort liability could result in school
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1463.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1466.
71. Id. at 1467.
72. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1370, 1372-74 (8th Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
73. Id. at 1371.
74. Id. at 1375.
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officials curtailing speech at the slightest fear of disturbance."" In han-
dling other issues raised on appeal, the court advised that Tinker re-
quired school officials to give students an opportunity to alter
questionable material and placed the burden on the school to justify
actions taken under the Tinker standard.76
Judge Wollman dissented, relying on the reasoning of a Third Circuit
case17 which had upheld the authority of school officials to halt produc-
tion of a school play with sexual content since the play was part of the
curriculum, and on language in Pico expressing deference to school of-
ficials in matters of curriculum. 78 In the judge's opinion, Tinker should
not be extended so as to grant school-sponsored newspapers the same
rights as the commercial press.79 "A contrary holding, as exemplified
by the majority opinion, pits students against school officials in a battle
for control over what is rightfully within the province of school offi-
cials." 80
By reaching a conclusion contrary to that of the district court with
respect to the classification of the student newspaper, the circuit major-
ity avoided a direct confrontation with the district court's application
of Tinker to the curriculum. The dissent followed the district court in
determining that the paper was part of the curriculum and agreed that
Tinker could not be expanded to provide the same protection for cur-
ricular matters as for instances of pure expression. The Supreme Court
was next to review these differing perspectives in rendering a decision
that promises to have considerable effect on how Tinker will be applied
in the future.
B. The Supreme Court's Reversal
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia joining the opin-
ion of Justice White. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent, which was joined
by Justices Marshall and Blackmun.
1. The Opinion of the Court
Justice White began his analysis with Tinker's famous quote: "Stu-
dents in public schools do not 'shed their constitutional rights to free-
75. Id. at 1376.
76. Id. at 1377.
77. Seyfried v. Walton, 668 l.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981).
78. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1378 (Wollman, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing the Pico dissents of Chief Justice Burger, 457 U.S. 853, 885 (1982) and
Justice Powell, id. at 894).
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dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' "I' He
continued, however, to cite Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
and Tinker for the proposition that students in the school setting do not
necessarily have the same rights as adults in other settings, and that the
school can "disassociate itself" from vulgar or inappropriate forms of
expression.82 "It is in this context that respondents' First Amendment
claims must be considered.''83
As will be made clear, the majority expressly limits the applicability
of Tinker in a way that it has not been limited heretofore. Justice
White's choice to begin the analysis with Tinker's most quoted lan-
guage, however, indicates that the Court is not prepared to abandon
that 1969 decision as a fundamental precedent for schoolhouse rights.4
Still, the immediate reliance on Fraser strongly suggests that that case is
also meant to limit the area in which Tinker controls. One recalls that
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Fraser argued that in disciplining the
student the school officials had presented enough evidence of disrup-
tion to satisfy the Tinker standard.85 His attempt to characterize the
two holdings in the same manner in the Kuhlmeier dissent is expressly
rejected by the majority. 86
Having established this tone, Justice White proceeded to an analysis
of the public forum question. He concluded that under the facts that
had come up from the district court, the newspaper was clearly part of
the school curriculum. Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Ed-
ucators' Association 7 recognized that school officials could determine
what speech was appropriate in the classroom or at school assemblies.
"It is this standard, rather than our decision in Tinker, that governs
this case," Justice White wrote. 88
Justice White distinguished between "personal expression that hap-
pens to occur on the school premises" (governed by Tinker) and
"school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other ex-
pressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
81. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 567 (1988) (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. In dissent, Justice Brennan refers to this "purport[ed]" " reaffirm[ation]" as an "ironic
introduction to an opinion that denudes high school students of much of the First Amendment
protection that Tinker itself prescribed." Id. at 580 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3167-68 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
86. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570 n.4.
87. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
88. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569.
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might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." 8 9
When the latter is the area of concern, the school may disassociate itself
from material that it considers violative of the Tinker standard and
"from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, in-
adequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or un-
suitable for immature audiences." 9 For these cases, the Court rejected
the notion that Tinker need apply and said, "[W]e hold that educators
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.'"91
Finally, Justice White underscored that the primary responsibility for
educating children rests at the local level and not with the federal
courts. Decisions to "censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical
production, or other vehicle of student expression" (identified earlier as
"activities which may fairly be characterized as part of the school cur-
riculum")92 implicate constitutional rights only when there is "no valid
educational purpose." 93
In view of the Court's past reluctance to discuss the parameters of
constitutional protection with respect to the curriculum, Justice White's
classifications are significant indeed. These marginal activities are now
deemed curricular in nature. Furthermore, Tinker does not control in
these instances. Rather, the actions of school officials now seem not to
implicate free speech concerns at all so long as they are taken with
"valid educational purpose."
Justice White concluded his opinion for the Court with a short state-
ment directed at the principal's actions in deleting the two pages of text
containing the objectionable stories from the edition of Spectrum. In
determining that the principal acted reasonably the Court seems to pro-
vide an example of one set of facts which pass the "valid educational
purpose" test. There is no evidence in the record, however, of a doctri-
naire intent of the sort found in the school board's actions held uncon-
89. Id.
90. Id. at 570 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 571 (footnote omitted).
92. Id. at 570.
93. Id. at 571. In its footnote 7 the Court implied approval of Nicholson v. Board of Educ.
of Torrance Unified School Dist., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d
214 (3d Cir. 1981); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925
(1978); and Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). These opinions similarly
determined that educators' decisions regarding the content of school-sponsored expressive activi-
ties are entitled to substantial deference. The Court noted that it was not deciding these ques-
tions with respect to college and university activities.
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stitutional by Pico.94 The broadest way that one might read this
example is that when an educator acts in good faith to evaluate a situa-
tion in terms which focus on quality of work or on the propriety of
materials for dissemination to students in the school environment, the
actions will be deemed to exhibit a "valid educational purpose." As
Justice White phrased it, the principal's decision was "reasonable under
the circumstances" and therefore "no violation of First Amendment
rights occurred." 9
2. Justice Brennan's Dissent
Justice Brennan's dissent contains a number of criticisms of the ma-
jority opinion. In general, however, it rests on the premise that Tinker
should not be shunted away from cases of the sort addressed in Kuhl-
meier, that the majority decision departed from precedent, and that the
decision opens the door to a variety of potential abuses.
The dissent should be read against the background of Pico and
Fraser. In Pico, Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion which de-
lineated a constitutional protection against the removal of books from
the library out of doctrinaire motives. It also suggested a "right to re-
ceive" for students. Indeed, Justice Brennan wrote that "[o]ur prece-
dents have long recognized certain constitutional limits upon the power
of the State to control even the curriculum and classroom. "9 However,
inexplicably, he wrote that "[p]etitioners might well defend their claim
of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their
duty to inculcate community values." 97 One might ask whether such
language is indicative of a desire to create a decisional majority in sup-
port of a holding that might later be extended. In Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser, Justice Brennan concurred "to express [his] under-
standing of the breadth of the Court's holding." 98 The thrust of his
concurrence was to claim that the majority was really applying the Tin-
ker standard to conclude that the school officials had acted properly in
disciplining the student conduct in question. In short, Justice Brennan
may have been trying to broaden the general Tinker philosophy in Pico.
He certainly tried in the Kuhlmeier dissent to protect it against narrow-
ing by the classification of activities within the school in such a way as
to take them out of Tinker's ambit.
94. Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
95. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 572.
96. Pico, 457 U.S. at 861.
97. Id. at 869 (emphasis in original).
98. 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3167 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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The dissent makes clear its position that Tinker must broadly control
in the school setting: "[Tihe First Amendment[] [contains] prohibitions
against censorship of any student expression that neither disrupts class-
work nor invades the rights of others, and against any censorship that
is not narrowly tailored to serve its purpose." 99 While acknowledging
that there is a delicate balance between the rights of students and the
legitimate exercise of school authority, the dissent maintained that "[in
Tinker, this Court struck the balance."'00
The majority expressly rejected Justice Brennan's claim that Fraser
was decided under the Tinker standard.10' The dissent was somewhat
more oblique in challenging the majority on whether its opinion might
be extended to school-sponsored activities at the university level. The
majority had raised the question by noting that it "need not now decide
whether the same degree of deference is appropriate" in the post-sec-
ondary setting.: 2 In contrast, Justice Brennan recalled the reliance on
Tinker in Papish v. University of Missouri Board of Curators'03 and
Healy v. James,1°M both cases involving universities. 0 5
The alternative Justice Brennan offers is to apply the "material dis-
ruption" language of Tinker in such a way as to consider poorly per-
formed journalism as a disruption of "a legitimate curricular
function."'"06 He then counters the majority's limiting technique: "The
Court today casts no doubt on Tinker's vitality. Instead it erects a tax-
onomy of school censorship, concluding that Tinker applies to one cat-
egory and not another." 10
Implicit in Justice Brennan's dissent is the realization that the major-
ity did not clearly articulate how to evaluate official action with respect
to school-sponsored activities. The dissent analyzed the principal's ac-
tions as they related to educational objectives and found the relation-
ship insufficient. 08 Furthermore, the Justice insisted that if the school
wished to disassociate itself from the expression, it had means available
short of censorship.1°9 Finally, Brennan writes, if the censorship were
permissible, the means used were not. The principal could have deleted
99. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 575.
101. Id. at 570 n.4.
102. Id. at 571 n.7.
103. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam) (newspaper sold on campus by permission).
104. 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (propriety of denying privileges to student political organization).
105. See Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 575 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 576.
107. Id. at 575.
108. Id. at 578-79.
109. Id. at 579.
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specific material without completely destroying two pages containing
more than the objectionable articles." 0
By criticizing the majority decision in this way, the dissent is pre-
pared to give teeth to any reasonableness evaluation of an educator's
actions. It is also establishing a basis for finding some "time, place,
and manner" restrictions unacceptable, recognizing that the majority
had stated that such a "reasonable manner" standard was the appro-
priate test for this case. "11
Justice Brennan's greatest concern over abandoning the Tinker stan-
dard, however, was that the majority's decision opened the way for
"thought control" by "stifling discussion of all but state-approved top-
ics" and by "school suppression of disfavored viewpoints." 2 "The
case before us aptly illustrates how readily school officials (and courts)
can camouflage viewpoint discrimination as the 'mere' protection of
students from sensitive topics."" 3
III. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT
v. KUHLMEIER
The Court unmistakenly "tinkered" with Tinker in Kuhlmeier. Fur-
thermore, it is clear that the majority now asserts that Fraser stands for
something different from Tinker. In Fraser, the Court established that
school officials can punish vulgar, lewd, and plainly offensive speech.
In Kuhlmeier, it teaches that Tinker does not apply to expressive activi-
ties that are school-sponsored. The case clearly will stand for much
more, but it is not so clear what that will be.
A. Kuhlmeier Reviewed
Kuhimeier identifies school-sponsored publications, theatrical prod-
uctions, and other expressive activities that might reasonably seem to be
school-approved. These are fairly considered part of the curriculum
even though they may take place outside the classroom. What, how-
ever, is the operative part of this classification? Is the Court limiting its
decision here to expressive activities, that is, those in which students
perform or present their ideas orally or in writing? Or, is the decision
meant to cover the entire curriculum?
If "expression" is intended, then the case significantly modifies the
applicability of Tinker, but it does not control academic freedom in the
110. Id. at 579-80.
111. Id. at 569.
112. Id. at 577-78.
113. Id. at 578.
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broader sense. The majority opinion makes not a single reference to
Pico. 1 4 Unlike Tinker, therefore, Pico is not expressly changed by the
Kuhimeier Court. Thus, Pico's holding with respect to books in the
library, and other non-curricular, voluntarily used materials, arguably
is unaffected. Though the Pico "right to receive" has yet to be clari-
fied, whatever effect it may have on the curriculum itself would seem to
be undisturbed under the "expressive" reading of Kuhimeier.
On the other hand, if the Court means its holding to apply to every-
thing which may fairly be classified as part of the curriculum, then the
effect is sweeping indeed. The high court has never expressly delineated
constitutional rights with respect to the curriculum, despite dicta in
Pico, outside of the establishment clause." 5 In fact, as the district court
opinion in Kuhlmeier illustrates, courts often have struggled with
whether some version of the Tinker standard must apply to the curricu-
lum. Still, classification of an activity as curricular vel non has been
important to judicial analysis, and it is certainly possible to read Kuhl-
meier as affirming the correctness of a curricular/non-curricular dis-
tinction. Any such general statement on the curriculum has
fundamental implications for academic freedom, that is, for any right
students may have to study or refrain from studying certain materials
and for teachers to control independently of the school officials what
they teach.
Several features of the Court's decision weigh against the "curricu-
lar" and for the "expressive" interpretation of the holding. The Court
speaks of "disassociating" from objectionable content in school-spon-
sored activities.' 16 Disassociation from what students study (by some-
thing like censorship) makes little sense, although it may have more
meaning with respect to a disagreement over what, or how, a teacher
decides to teach. Secondly, the references to Perry Education Associa-
tion,"7 a case which affirmed time, place, and manner restrictions in
the school context, suggest that the Court has in mind such restrictions
directed at the active expression of ideas. Again, such a distinction does
not fit well with students studying curricular materials-though it may
be applicable to teachers presenting those materials. Finally, the
Court's consistent and recent pronouncements on the curriculum and
the establishment clause 18 indicate that it is quite willing to find uncon-
stitutional official action with respect to the curriculum.
114. Justice Brennan cites Pico five times. Id. at 573, 574, 578, 580.
115. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
116. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 567.
117. Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37 (1983), cited in Kuhl-
meier, 108 S. Ct. at 568, 569.
118. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
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This question concerning the extent of the holding becomes all the
more pressing when one asks what standard of review the Court has
established in Kuhlmeier. The Tinker standard is expressly eschewed,
over Justice Brennan's strenuous objection. In the school setting the
actions must be merely "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.'"" 9
The majority opinion's analysis of the principal's actions in Kuhl-
meier gives some indication of what may be considered reasonable. In
this case, however, despite Justice Brennan's efforts to suggest that it is
not possible to see these actions as reasonably related to pedagogical
concerns, the motivation does not appear to be against the views ex-
pressed by the students. It is very much an open question, then,
whether the Court would move toward a fourteenth amendment ra-
tional relationship standard in which virtually everything school offi-
cials do, short of implicating the establishment 'clause, is acceptable, or
whether it would continue to adhere to an examination such as the one
suggested in Pico, under which doctrinaire motives trigger careful con-
stitutional scrutiny.
The dissent makes clear that a highly permissive standard will allow
school officials to engage in thought control.' 20 The potential danger is
real enough. If school officials are relieved of all concern for proper
motive and claim a pedagogical purpose, then those children of a mi-
nority world view stand at the mercy of school officials who wish to
control what they learn, out of personal or political motives.
It is also unclear whether university students and professors are af-
fected by the decision. The majority noted that the distinction of
school-sponsored from non-school-sponsored speech was consistent
with Papish v. University of Missouri Board of Curators,2' where the
newspaper was not school-funded, but was allowed to be sold on cam-
pus. 22 Instead of announcing that there remained a different standard
for the university environment, the Court in Kuhlmeier noted only that
it was not called upon to decide the degree of deference appropriate to
control of school-sponsored university expressive activities. Granted
that the Court avoids gratuitous decisions, such a statement cannot be
comforting to university-supported literary magazines, newspapers, and
drama departments.
In Fraser and Kuhlmeier the Court reentered the realm of the schools
and the speech clause. The Court has made clear that it will not extend
119. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 571.
120. Id. at 578-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
122. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570 n.3.
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the reasoning of Pico. Furthermore, it is ready to back away from Tin-
ker by limiting the areas to which it applies.
On analysis, Kuhimeier must be considered an unsatisfactory deci-
sion. In view of the reluctance of the Court to involve itself in matters
close to the operations of the schools, it seems likely that its decision
should be read narrowly, as applying to "expressive" school-sponsored
activities. It is intended to affirm that the schools can provide opportu-
nities to students for expression without fearing that they will be help-
less to control these activities if they threaten to get out of hand. 23 The
fact that it does not expressly overrule Tinker and that the Court has
quite recently shown that it will enforce the establishment clause argues
strongly against reading Kuhlmeier to mean that the schools are as free
to regulate students and teachers in the face of the first amendment as,
for example, the states are to regulate commerce in the face of substan-
tive due process. It would have been much more satisfactory had the
majority opinion made this clear.
The dissent brings forth the principal argument against giving school
officials the Court's blessing for virtually unfettered leave to control the
entire curriculum. It is simply too easy to limit in the name of educa-
tional objectives the free inquiry which teaches the young to deal with
competing ideas. As long as a principal function of our Constitution is
to protect the few from forced march down the road chosen by the
many, it cannot be constitutional for students or teachers in a public
school to be without protection from public officials who seek to force
the curriculum of the schools into a doctrinaire mold. Perhaps Justice
Brennan's attempt to use the Tinker standard as a guide to curricular
analysis is unacceptable. Nonetheless, the courts must have some pro-
tective standard by which to review suspect behavior. The "reasonable-
ness" standard articulated by the majority in Kuhimeier may be
effective, but only if it is used in a way similar to that the Court utilized
to examine official intent in Pico, that is, in a way that acknowledges
the traditional locus of school control and at the same time affords real
protection against abuses.
B. Kuhlmeier Applied: Virgil v. School Board'2 4
Less than three weeks after the Supreme Court issued its Kuhlmeier
decision, a federal district judge upheld the removal of a textbook from
the curriculum by a school board, and interpreted Kuhlmeier to require
123. See id. at 572 n.9.
124. 677 F. Supp. 1547 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
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this outcome despite personal reservations against the board's meth-
ods. 1 21
The district court in Virgil v. School Board26 was faced with cross
motions for summary judgment on essentially undisputed facts. A par-
ent voiced objection to the school board over the content of a school
humanities text, specifically a translation of Lysistrata by the ancient
Greek playwright Aristophanes and The Miller's Tale by Geoffrey
Chaucer. The book was a state-approved text used in a course taken by
eleventh and twelfth graders. It was the only state-approved humanities
text. Neither of the works was assigned reading, but portions of Lysis-
trata were read aloud in one class. A committee report suggested that
the two works not be used in required readings but that the textbook be
retained in the curriculum. On recommendation of the school superin-
tendent, who disagreed with that report, the school board decided to
remove the book from the curriculum and place the school's copies in a
store room. The text was kept in the library, however, as were other
translations of the works.127
District Judge Black's opinion quotes the school board's reasons for
its decision. Because these provide a clear statement of purpose against
which the court judged the reasonableness of the board's actions, it is
useful to list them here:
1. The sexuality in the two selections.
2. A belief that portions of the two selections were excessively
vulgar in language and subject matter, regardless of the value of the
works as literary classics.
3. A belief that the subject matter of the selections was immoral,
insofar as the selections involved graphic, humorous treatment of
sexual intercourse and dealt with sexual intercourse out of wedlock.
4. A belief that the sexuality of the selections was violative of the
socially and philosophically conservative mores, principles and values
of most of the Columbia County populace.
5. A belief that the subject matter and language of the selections
would be offensive to a substantial portion of the Columbia County
populace.
6. A belief that the two selections were not necessary for adequate
instruction in the course; nor was this particular textbook, in its
entirety, necessary for instruction in the course.
7. A belief that the two selections were inappropriate to the age,
maturity, and development of the students in question.12
125. Id. at 1552-53.
126. Id. at 1551.
127. Id. at 1549.
128. Id.
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Plaintiffs, having briefed the case prior to Kuhlmeier, argued that
because the course was an elective and the readings optional, Pico
should govern. 29 The court rejected the invitation to apply Pico. "In
light of [Kuhlmeier], this Court need not decide whether the plurality
decision in Pico may logically be extended to optional curriculum mate-
rials. Kuhlmeier resolves any doubts as to the appropriate standard to
be applied whenever a curriculum decision is subject to first amend-
ment review."' 30 Judge Black noted that while Kuhlmeier did not spe-
cifically address textbooks it did appear to "address a wide realm of
'curriculum' decisions."'' Although plaintiffs argued that the school
board's action amounted to an attempt "to impose their fundamental-
ist Christian beliefs on the students," they did not argue a violation of
the establishment clause.'32 The court agreed that the school board's
action reflected its "own restrictive views," but held that Kuhlmeier
allowed for broad regulation of sensitive topics, especially those dealing
with sexuality.'33
Of great interest to those who ask how Kuhlmeier will be applied is
the court's analysis of the "reasonableness" standard. Judge Black
concluded that despite her personal difficulty in seeing how exposure to
these classics could harm older high school students and the perception
that the board might have chosen a less restrictive approach, Kuhlmeier
sanctioned pedagogical concern for sexually vulgar materials and did
not mandate that the means be the least restrictive, only that they be
reasonable. 34
In light of the analysis of Kuhlmeier offered above, one must be dis-
appointed by the Virgil decision. Apparently Judge Black felt com-
pelled to render the decision based on Kuhlmeier. However, this
compulsion is a result of a determination that Kuhlmeier is at last the
Supreme Court's statement on the curriculum. As the previous analysis
argues, such is not the reasonable reading of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. Rather, the Court seems to be establishing a standard different
from Tinker for curricular expressive activities. Hence, Kuhlmeier does
not preclude the Virgil plaintiffs' appeal to Pico, which on the surface
seems to have been proper, since Virgil did not involve expressive activ-
ity.
129. Id. at 1550 n.2.
130. Id. at 1551 (footnote omitted).
131. Id. at n.4.
132. Id. at 1550 n.l, 1552.
133. Id. at 1550. Judge Black apparently did believe that had the board tried to enforce a
political belief it would have fallen afoul of West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
which found that forcing students to pledge allegiance to the flag was unconstitutional. Id.
134. Id. at 1552.
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Judge Black's effort to discern the proper standard suggested by
Kuhlmeier illustrates the weakness of that decision. The district judge
suggests that in her view the Court did not overrule all limits on the
actions of the school board, so long as the actions may be deemed rea-
sonable. Virgil does assert a belief, however, that inculcation allows the
board to approve a rather restrictive range of literary experience and
exposure to literary methods of effective political expression (Lysis-
trata) and social commentary (The Miller's Tale).
IV. CONCLUSION
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,"I the Supreme Court de-
livered a decision which could have a profound effect on the place of
the Constitution in the public schools. Except in cases decided under
the establishment clause, the Court has not before ruled expressly in a
case which measured the demands of students and teachers to some
first amendment protection with respect to the public school curricu-
lum.
Since 1969, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District3 6 has
been the Court's principal statement on first amendment rights in the
school. In 1982, Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
District No. 26 v. Pico1 7 made an attempt to delineate more specific
rights-limiting school officials in their right to remove books from a
school library. This was a plurality opinion, however, which has been
taken both as a "pro-student" and as a "pro-school" case. In 1986, the
Court limited Tinker's application in Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser,3 which established that the school may discipline students for
speech that is lewd or vulgar. Kuhlmeier limits Tinker further by teach-
ing that there is a difference in protection of speech within the school
environment which is not a part of a "curricular" activity and speech
within "expressive" activities, such as school newspapers and dramatic
performances which are "curricular" in nature.
Kuhlmeier is an unsatisfactory decision in that it does not make clear
the limits of its application. Furthermore, it does not establish a suffi-
ciently clear standard of evaluation for school board conduct in the ar-
eas to which the decision applies. It is possible to consider Kuhlmeier a
general curriculum decision, as one district court has already done. This
interpretation does not seem to fit the language of the decision, espe-
cially if read in historical context. But the danger of misinterpretation is
135. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
136. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
137. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
138. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
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great, as Virgil v. School Board39 illustrates. Furthermore, in view of
the recent history of establishment clause decisions and of the Court's
approval of Tinker in proper context, it does not appear that the Court
has meant that school officials have absolute control of students and
teachers in "curricular" settings. Nonetheless, Kuhlmeier establishes a
'reasonableness" test that will leave courts uncertain as to their duty.
In summary, the Supreme Court has spoken expressly concerning the
speech clause and curriculum for the first time. The result may cause
more confusion than clarification in this vexed area of constitutional
protection. If academic freedom is to have any meaning in the public
schools after Kuhlmeier, the Court must make clear whether or not that
decision is generally applicable to the curriculum or only to "expres-
sive" activities. Furthermore, and especially if this is to be a general
"curricular" decision, it must make clear that its Kuhlmeier test can be
failed by boards acting with doctrinaire motive. To hold otherwise is to
risk pockets of thought control inimical to the Constitution and to the
preservation of free thought.
Walter E. Forehand*
139. 677 F. Supp. 1547 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
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